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Abstract
In this work we explore the use of process algebra in formalising and analysing
access control policies. We do this by considering a standard access control language
(XACML) and show how the core concepts in the language can be represented in CSP.
We then show how properties of these policies may also be described in CSP, and how
model checking may be used to verify that a policy meets the property.
We further consider how we may introduce a notion of workflow into this framework,
and show that a simple appreciation of the workflow context may limit the things we
need to verify about a policy.
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In this work we explore the use of process algebra in formalising and analysing
access control policies. We do this by considering a standard access control language
(XACML) and show how the core concepts in the language can be represented in CSP.
We then show how properties of these policies may also be described in CSP, and how
model checking may be used to verify that a policy meets the property.
We further consider how we may introduce a notion of workflow into this framework,
and show that a simple appreciation of the workflow context may limit the things we
need to verify about a policy.
1 Introduction
Through the use of web services, web-enabled businesses are able to respond quickly to
emerging market opportunities by combining to form Virtual Organisations (VOs) de-
signed precisely to meet these opportunities. These VOs operate in many repsects as an
ordinary business organisation: in bidding for market share and in designing, developing
and marketing a product.
Although not as tightly coupled as a single organisation with several departments, the
VO partners must move from mutual mistrust to having an increased trust and reliance
in each other’s business processes. Individuals in one partner may be allowed access to
sensitive material in another partner’s database, or a joint VO database may be set up for
shared data, and the access policy of that database must be consistent with the policies
of the VO partners. When this happens, partners need to be assured that the VO policies
are consistent with their own internal policies, and that the combination of policies does
not introduce any unwanted behaviour.
We present a method for verifying the behaviour of access control policies, and for
comparing access control policies with each other. Taking XACML as our example, we
show that many of the core concepts of access control can be represented concisely in the
process algebra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). By assigning an already well
understood semantic model to XACML, we are able to take advantage of the associated
theory, as well as its model checker FDR.
We then show how we can check policies against desired properties, and thereby demon-
strate that the policies uphold the properties. We can also compare policies with each other
to demonstrate, for example, that all behaviours forbidden by one policy are also forbidden
by the other.
A VO can form around an agreed workflow, where each partner has a clear understand-
ing of the tasks it is to perform within the consortium. It may be that these tasks do not
require any access control decisions over which the policies conflict. We show how, in a
suitably restrictive workflow context, certain conflicts between policies may be ignored.
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [5, 9, 13] is a well established formal
method that has already proved highly effective in security applications, in particular
the analysis of security protocols [12] and the formulation of security policies [10, 11]. The
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work presented here builds on the work reported in [11]. In Section 2 we briefly review the
parts of CSP which we shall need.
XACML [8] is the OASIS standard for access control policies. It provides a XML-based
language for describing role-based access control policies, and a language for checking the
legality of actions with respect to a policy. In Section 3 we present the elements of XACML
which we consider.
In Section 4 we show how to capture XACML policies using CSP, and how we model
the request/response behaviour of a policy. In Section 5 we demonstrate the approach
using an extended example, taken from [3]. In Section 6 we show how two access control
policies may be compared, and in Section 7 we show how the concept of workflow may be
incorporated into this work, and how even a simple abstraction of a workflow may be make
some of the conflicts between access control policies irrelevant.
2 CSP
Here we briefly introduce the elements of CSP that we shall use: more detail can be found
in [9, 13]. A CSP description of a system contains processes which can perform events.
We adhere to the convention that processes are written in upper case, events in lower case,
and names of sets of events begin with a capital letter.
STOP is the trivial process which can perform no events. SKIP is the process which
successfully terminates, and then behaves as STOP . This is used when processes are to
be executed in sequence. The process P ;Q will behave as process P until P successfully
terminates, and then process Q will begin. The process a → STOP will perform the event
a, then behave as STOP . We will use the channel notation: events may take the form c.a
where c is a channel and a is a value drawn from the channel type. Channel types may
be compounded: if c has the type A×B , then c.a.b represents an event a.b on channel c,
where a ∈ A and b ∈ B .
If P and Q are CSP processes, then the process P 2 Q may behave as P or Q and the
choice is made by the external environment. The process P u Q may also behave as P or
Q , but here the choice is made internally, and the environment has no control. We will
also used the parameterised versions of internal and external choice: 2 a : A • a → P(a)
offers the environment a choice of the events from set A, and u a : A • a → P(a) resolves
the same choice internally.
P ||| Q is the interleaving of P and Q , and each component process proceeds in-
dependently. ||| a : A • P(a) allows card(A) processes to proceed independently, each
parameterised by a different value from A.
If A is a set of events, the process P |[ A ]|Q need only synchronise on events from A.
P \ A behaves as P , except that events from A are hidden from the environment.
RUNA is the process which is always ready to perform any event from the set A. It is
defined as RUNA = 2 a : A → RUNA. If A is understood, then STOP{a} is the process
which blocks the event a, but is always ready to perform any other event from A. It is
defined as STOP{a} = RUNA |[ {a} ]|STOP .
CSP has various theories of process equivalence associated with it. The most simple of
these, trace equivalence, is sufficient for us here. In it a process P is identified with the set
of traces that it can perform (given by tr(P)), and P and Q are equivalent if and only if
tr(P) = tr(Q).
We also use the notion of refinement. P is a (trace) refinement of Q (written P vtr Q)
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when the set of traces it can perform is a subset of those of Q . Thus
P vtr Q ⇔ tr(Q) ⊆ tr(P)
Trace refinement is sufficient for capturing safety properties. If Q is all the safe behaviours,
then any refinement P of Q will only have safe behaviours. No guarantees are made about
liveness, however. In particular, the process STOP is a refinement of all other processes.
For our present task safety properties will suffice, and we will use v for vtr .
3 XACML and access control
XACML [8] is an OASIS standard that describes (in XML) both a policy language and an
access control decision language. The decision language allows access control requests to
be made of a policy, and provides a response based on the policy.
Every XACML policy will have an associated Policy Decision Point (PDP) and a Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP). Requests are formed in the decision language by the PEP and
sent to the PDP. The PDP implements the policy under consideration, and requests are
either permitted or denied (unless some error occurs), and the decision is returned to the
PEP. The PDP may query the context to learn the value of environmental attributes, and
make its decision based on these values. In this work we will focus on the interaction
between the PDP and the PEP.
A request is from a subject (e.g. a user or a process) to perform an action (e.g. read,
write, copy) on a resource (e.g. a file or a disk) within an environment (e.g. during work
hours or from a secure machine).
If a subject requests permission for an action on a resource in an environment, a policy
will return exactly one of
• permit if the subject is permitted to perform the action on the resource in the
environment,
• deny if the subject is not permitted to perform the action on the resource in the
environment,
• Indeterminate if some error occurs, or
• NotApplicable if the request can’t be answered by the service.
Rules in XACML contain a target (which further contains resources, subjects, actions,
and the environment of the rule), an effect (permit or deny) and a condition on the
application of the rule. In this paper we restrict our attention to targets and effects.
We consider the environment in Section 4.4.
Policies comprise sets of rules, and a rule combination algorithm. Like rules, they also
contain a target (again resources, subjects, actions and environment). They also contain a
notion of obligation. These obligations are a separate responsibility of the PEP. Since we
are focusing on the interaction between the PDP and the PEP, we do not consider them
further.
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4 XACML and CSP
We form the CSP model of an access control policy by beginning with an unconstrained
model of the Policy Decision Point. We then compose the constraints that represent the
rules, in a way which remains true to the particular rule combining algorithm used by the
policy.
The Policy Enforcement Point is modelled as a process PEP which can attempt to
synchronise with PDP on any event from the shared interface. These attempted synchro-
nisations represent requests. If the synchronisation occurs, the request is considered to
be granted. If it fails, the request is considered to be refused. Responsibility for avoiding
deadlock lies entirely with the PEP, which is also the real-world situation.
The CSP model will thus look like
PEP |[ Interface ]|PDP
Strictly speaking, a request can be permitted under two different circumstances in this
model: by not including it in the set Interface, (and by default allowing it to proceed
unhindered) or explicitly allowing it within PDP .
NotApplicable is the result returned by a policy, if the policy has nothing to say (either
in favour or against) about a particular request. We assume that all requests about which
the PDP has rules are in Interface, and so we do not model NotApplicable as a separate
return from the PDP.
Indeterminate is returned if, for example, an error occurs within the environment
when evaluating a rule. In our model we do not go outside the PDP and PEP, and
therefore consider that each synchronisation request is either accepted or refused.
Our focus here is on the interaction between the PDP and the PEP, so we will not
develop an explicit environment process here. However this model could easily be extended
to include one. We show in section 4.4 how simple environmental behaviour may be
encapsulated within the PDP process.
4.1 Modelling requests
Following the approach taken in [11], actions, subjects and resources are straightforwardly
modelled using compound channels. We take the name of the action to be the name of the
channel, and the type of the channel to be Subject × Resource. Thus, the channel defined
channel read : Subject .Resource
denotes a channel called read with the type Subject .Resource, and events on this channel
take the form read .s.r , where s and r are members of the sets Subject and Resource
respectively.
4.2 Modelling roles
A role is a set of rights and obligations that a user may choose to assume. Users may be
entitled to a number of roles, and may swap between them. Typically, although a user may
hold a number of roles simultaneously, any request must be with respect to a single role.
Requests to perform actions will be evaluated by the policy in the context of the current
role of the user. In [8] roles are represented as attributes.
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Following [11], we introduce roles into our model of requests by enriching the space of
events. If Role is the set of all roles known to the policy, then the channel definition
channel read : Subject .Role.Resource
includes the role that a subject holds when making a read request on some resource. So, for
example, the event read .anne.superuser .file1 represents the request by anne as superuser
to read file1.
4.3 Modelling single rules
We consider adding to a policy a rule that relates to a request by subject s to perform
action read on resource r . RULE1, which permits this request, is then defined:
RULE1 = read .s.r → RULE1
A rule which denies a request can be captured in the CSP model simply by including
the request event in the interface to the policy, and ensuring that the policy says nothing
further about this request. However, it is possible (and illustrated in section 4.5) that a
policy contain two rules, both of which refer to the same request. In this case, it becomes
important to retain an explicit CSP representation of each rule, in order to accurately
reproduce the semantics of the rule combining algorithm. We therefore choose to capture
the rule which denies read.s.r as:
RULE2 = STOP{read .s.r}
where STOP{read .s.r} is the process that permits any event except read .s.r .
To allow a subject s1 to read any member of the set Resource, we write
RULEANY = 2 r : Resource • read .s1.r → RULEANY
and we can similarly allow a choice of subjects.
4.4 Capturing the environment
In the XACML specification [8], the environment is defined as the set of attributes that
are relevant to an authorisation decision and independent of a particular subject, resource
or action. Thus far we have presented rules which either always permit or always deny
a request, and are independent of their environment. Simple environment-sensitive rules
can be formed using processes similar to the above, as well as the CSP sequencing and
choice operators. For example, consider a rule which permits access during work hours, and
forbids it otherwise. To encode this, we first introduce two new events into the alphabet
of the PDP, start-of-day and end-of-day. The rule can then be written as two mutually-
recursive processes:
OUTOFHOURS = start of day →WORKHOURS
WORKHOURS = read .s.r →WORKHOURS
2
end of day → OUTOFHOURS
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This can then be incorporated into the PDP as an ordinary rule, using OUTOFHOURS if
the PDP begins operation outside of normal working hours, and WORKHOURS otherwise.
More complex environmental conditions can be formed as combinations of this type of
rule, although a more comprehensive modelling of environment behaviour will probably
require a separate environment process.
4.5 Combining rules into policies
There are a number of rule combining algorithms in the XACML standard. We consider
as exemplars the deny-overrides and the permit-overrides algorithms, taken from [8].
The deny-overrides algorithm denies a request if any one rule in the PDP denies it. The
permit-overrides algorithm permits a request if any one rule in the PDP permits it.
Different algorithms will result in different overall processes, even if they begin with the
same set of rules.
There is a very close fit between the CSP parallel combinators and the two *-overrides
algorithms. deny-overrides is naturally encoded as a communicating parallel composition
of rules, communicating on the request event. permit-overrides is naturally encoded as
a parallel interleaving combination of rules, with no communication between the rules.
If both RULE1 and RULE2 refer to the request read.s.r, we can combine them into a
single policy using the deny-overrides rule combining algorithm as:
RULE1 |[ {read .s.r} ]|RULE2
Any request for read .s.r will be denied if either RULE1 or RULE2 deny it. For the
request read .s.r to be permitted, both RULE1 and RULE2 would have to permit the
action read .s.r . If RULE1 and RULE2 are defined as in section 4.3, then all requests from
PEP to perform the action read.s.r will be denied, because RULE2 denies it.
The behaviour of the permit-overrides algorithm, is also easily described, this time
using CSP interleaving as:
RULE1 ||| RULE2
This time, any request to perform read .s.r will be permitted.
Other algorithms are discussed in [8]. An interesting one is first-applicable, where
the first applicable rule is used to answer any query. This would prove much more of a
challenge to describe in CSP, because the CSP parallel operators are commutative.
Other rules in [8] include ordered-deny-overrides, and ordered-permit-overrides.
These differ from their unordered variants only in the order of the evaluation of the rules.
In particular, they will return identical values to their unordered variants, at the level of
abstraction we use here.
In XACML, policies may be collected into sets, and these sets may be combined ac-
cording to different algorithms. Within CSP we would combine policies in the same way
that we combine rules, by using appropriate choices of the parallel composition operators.
5 Introductory example
Our example is derived from the example given in [3], which describes the access control
requirements of a university database which contains student grades. We show how specify
the appropriate policy at each stage. We then show how properties of these policies can
6
be formally defined and checked using the CSP model checker FDR [7], and how we can
use this to discover mistakes and oversights in the policies.
There are n users of the database, each of which may take the role faculty or student.
The database contains internal and external grades, and the relevant actions are receive,
assign and view. We begin with the following datatype and channel declarations:
datatype User = {1 . . . n}
datatype Role = faculty | student
datatype Grade = internal | external
channel assign, receive, view : User .Role.Grade
All the possible events on this database are given by Allevents:
Allevents = {assign.u.r .g , view .u.r .g , receive.u.r .g |
u ← User , r ← Role, g ← Grade}
We begin by defining the unconstrained database policy as the CSP process D BASE
which allows any of these actions. We then add the constraints incrementally.
D BASE = 2 u : User • (2 r : Role • (2 g : Grade • (
view .u.r .g → D BASE
2
assign.u.r .g → D BASE
2
receive.u.r .g → D BASE )))
The policy imposed on this database is
Requests for students to receive external grades, and for staff to assign and view
both internal and external grades, will succeed.
We describe this policy by defining processes which capture the effect it has on users.
The same policy applies to each user, so we first describe the policy as it applies to a single
user, parameterised by i .
USER(i) = receive.i .student .ext → USER(i)
2
2 g : Grade • assign.i .faculty .g → USER(i)
2
2 g : Grade • view .i .faculty .g → USER(i)
Any user in the role of student may receive external grades, and any user in the role of
faculty may assign all grades, and view all grades. The interleaved combination of all these
policies gives us our model of the policy.
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ALL USERS = ||| u : User • (USER(u))
The user policy runs in parallel with the database policy, communicating on Allevents.
PDP is thus described as:
PDP = ALL USERS |[ Allevents ]|D BASE
To validate a model, we attempt to prove properties (or validation conjectures) which
we believe to be true. The following property is found in [3].
Property 1 There do not exist members of Student who can assign external grades.
Following [11], we begin by defining a set of events Breach1. The occurrence of any of
these events indicates a violation of Property 1.
Breach1 = {assign.u.student .ext | u → User}
The property is then proved by asserting that no event from the set Breach1 can occur.
PDP [| Breach1 |]STOP v PDP
FDR quickly tells us that this assertion holds. This means that when PDP is unable to
perform any events from Breach1, it still has at least as many traces as the unrestricted
PDP . In fact, we are only removing possible events by putting PDP in parallel with
STOP , so the two processes above have the same traces. Explicitly forbidding all events
from the set Breach1 makes no difference to the behaviour of PDP .
5.1 Enforcing roles within the PDP
Going back to property 1, we must be careful to distinguish between two different inter-
pretations of this property. We could be referring to user in the role of a student or user
who is able to hold the role of a student. The distinction becomes important if it is possible
for a user to take different roles at different times. We therefore make the property more
precise, as:
Property 2 No user who has previously assumed the role of Student can assign external
grades.
To validate this property, we need to redefine the PDP to track previous user behaviour.
We allow a user to make the choice between acting as a student or a faculty member. The
user behaviour is then constrained by the PDP, according to the choice they have made.
We introduce two new events:
channel choose stu, choose fac : User
which are used by the PDP to track the choices the users make. ENFORCE USERS
is defined as the parameterised process which forces users to choose between faculty and
8
student , then allows the users to perform a single action from the chosen role. The users
then choose roles again.
ENFORCE USERS (i) = choose stu.i → STUDENT (i); ENFORCE USERS (i)
2
choose fac.i → FACULTY (i); ENFORCE USERS (i)
STUDENT (i) = receive.i .student .ext → SKIP
FACULTY (i) = 2 g : Grade • (assign.i .faculty .g → SKIP)
2
2 g : Grade • (view .i .faculty .g → SKIP)
The users are combined and a new PDP (PDP2) is then built up as
ENF ALL USERS = ||| u : User • (ENFORCE USERS (u))
PDP2 = ENF ALL USERS |[Allevents ]| ]D BASE
A breach of Property 2 corresponds to: for some i an assign.i .stu.ext event is pre-
ceded by a choose stu.i event. We therefore want to assert that, for any user i , after a
choose stu.i event the assign.i .stu.ext event cannot happen.
The general approach is as follows. For each user, we define PERMIT A UNTIL B as
the process which permits any number of assign events until the point where a choose stu
event occurs. After the choose stu event, no further assign event is permitted. These
processes allows only behaviours which meet Property 2. If, when placed in parallel with
this process, the behaviour of PDP2 is altered, then the unconstrained PDP2 must allow
an illegal event, and the FDR model checker will return a trace which violates the property.
We define this as follows:
PERMIT A UNTIL B(i) = 2 r : Role • (assign.i .r .ext → PERMIT A UNTIL B(i))
2
choose stu.i → JUST B(i)
where
JUST B(i) = choose stu.i → JUST B(i)
For all roles, any external grades may be assigned, but as soon as a user performs a
choose stu.i event, they are no longer allowed to make any assignments to external grades.
They are only allowed (by JUST B) to continue to perform the action choose stu.i . Now,
for any i , the choose stu.i event is continually allowed until the first event from the set
{assign.i .fac.ext , assign.i .stu.ext} occurs.
Finally, the RESTRICT process is defined as
RESTRICT = ||| u : User • PERMIT A UNTIL B(u)
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and when we place it in parallel with PDP2, communicating only on Res events, where
Res events = {choose stu.u, assign.u.r .ext | u ← User , r ← Role}
and check
PDP2 |[ Res events ]|RESTRICT v PDP2
FDR quickly tells us that this fails to check. The trace returned by the debugger is:
〈choose stu.i , choose fac.i , assign.i .fac.ext〉
which shows that a user may choose the student role, then later choose the faculty role
and assign external grades.
This issue is the well-known one of separation of duty. The problem is that users are
allowed to swap in and out of roles, and a student can re-login as a faculty member and
acquire all the privileges associated with that. We address this in the next section.
5.2 Separation of duty
Separation of duty is an important aspect of access control, and a possible way to implement
that is history-based authorisations [2]. We show that is possible in our model. To specify
a once-for-all separation of duty constraint, we define (following [11])
SEP USERS (i) = (choose stu.i → STUDENT (i)
2
choose fac.i → FACULTY (i))
where
STUDENT (i) = receive.i .student .ext → STUDENT (i)
FACULTY (i) = 2 g : Grade • (assign.i .faculty .g → FACULTY (i))
2
2 g : Grade • (view .i .faculty .g → FACULTY (i))
Users now must choose their role before they can do any other action, and are compelled
to remain within their role. The totality of the user behaviour is now given by
ALL SEP USERS = ||| i : User • (SEP USERS (i))
and the new system is defined as
PDP3 = ALL SEP USERS |[ Allevents ]|D BASE
This time the assertion
PDP3 |[ Interface ]|RESTRICT v PDP3
holds, demonstrating that separation of duty using a history-based authorisation is a pos-
sible method for ensuring property 2.
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6 Comparing policies
To compare two policies P1 and P2, we can check for trace refinement in each direction.
If P1 v P2, the behaviours P1 allows are a subset of those that P2 allows, and P1 is more
restrictive that P2. If P1 v P2 and P2 v P1, the two processes are equivalent. By hiding
events we are not concerned about, we can consider only the relevant subset of events, and
compare behaviours with respect to that subset.
To illustrate all this, we extend our policy to include another role and then compare
the original to the extended version. Following [3], we first introduce a teaching assistant
role. Students may opt to be teaching assistants, and teaching assistants may assign and
view internal grades but not external ones. We then show how to compare this policy with
the previous one using FDR.
The Role datatype is extended to include teaching assistants:
datatype Role = faculty | student | ta
ENF USERS enforces the initial choice between student and faculty as before, and
EXT USERS , which we go on to define, allows students to drop into the teaching assistant
role. We include an extra channel to mark this choice.
channel choose stu, choose fac, choose ta : User
EXT USERS (i) = choose stu.i → EXT STUDENT (i)
2
choose fac.i → FACULTY (i)
EXT STUDENT process can behave as OLD STUDENT , or make the choice to upgrade
to teaching assistant privileges.
EXT STUDENT (i) = receive.i .student .ext → EXT STUDENT (i)
2
choose ta.i → (assign.i .ta.int → EXT STUDENT (i)
2
view .i .ta.int → EXT STUDENT (i))
Faculty is as before:
FACULTY (i) = 2 g : Grade • (assign.i .faculty .g → FACULTY (i))
2
2 g : Grade • (view .i .faculty .g → FACULTY (i))
The users are combined to form the systems
ALL EXT USERS = ||| i : User • (EXT USERS (i))
EXT POLICY = ALL EXT USERS |[ Allevents ]|POLICY
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We compare this policy EXT PDP with PDP3 by comparing the sets of traces that
they both produce. An obvious immediate difference is that EXT PDP can perform
choose ta.i events, but what concerns us here is whether we have any new behaviour
with respect to the original set of events, so we hide all choose ta.i events. We can now
meaningfully compare trace refinement in both directions.
EXT PDP \ {choose ta.u | u ← User} v PDP3
This check passes, indicating that, excluding the choose ta events, no traces forbidden by
EXT PDP are permitted by PDP3.
However, when we try to check:
PDP3 v EXT PDP \ {choose ta.u | u ← User}
it fails, indicating the presence of a trace allowed by EXT PDP which is not allowed by
PDP3. The trace returned by FDR shows
〈choose stu.1, choose ta.1, assign.1.ta.ext〉
pointing out that a student may choose the teaching assistant role, then use this role to
assign external grades.
This sort of problem could be dealt with in a number of ways. We have already
demonstrated how enforcing separation of duty is one solution, and this could again be
used here. In the next section we show how taking the workflow context into account may
be a possible solution.
7 Including Workflow
A possible context in which we may want to combine access control policies is a situation
such as a Virtual Organisation (VO), where a number of independent actors want to work
together on a project, and each has a security policy they wish to enforce on joint assets of
the VO. In a situation like this, there may be many points of conflict between the policies.
It is possible, however, the the particular workflow being enacted means that there will be
no access requests which cause the conflicting rules to be consulted. If the task the VO
was proposing was relatively benign, only the consistent parts of the policies may need to
be consulted.
To show how a VO might take advantage of this, in this section we show how to
combine a representation of workflow with a policy. We then show how this representation
of workflow may limit the points at which we have to consider access control issues.
In order to combine it with a CSP model of a policy, a model of workflow must be a
CSP process. Also, the alphabet of this workflow process must overlap with the alphabet
of the policy, or it will have no impact.
Workflow is a rich concept. Here, however, we limit our representation of workflow to
the impact it has on access control decisions. We are not interested, for example, in what
a user must do with a document, simply in whether or not they have access to it.
We therefore enforce the workflow in one sense, by insisting that the only access control
actions that are taken are those necessary for the workflow. This is not enforcement
workflow sense of ensuring that obligations are met.
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As an example, consider a workflow that stipulates that teaching assistants assign in-
ternal grades, then faculty members assign external grades, then the students receive their
external grades. We let the workflow take account of the role choices, and only com-
plete each subprocess when every role chosen within that subprocess has been rescinded.
Consider the definition
WORKFLOW = ASSIGN INT GRADES ;
ASSIGN EXT GRADES ;
REC GRADES ; STOP
where the components are described below.
ASSIGN INT GRADES = u i : User • choose ta.i → ASSIGN INT (i)
u SKIP
ASSIGN INT (i) = assign.i .ta.int → ASSIGN INT (i)
u
drop ta.i → ASSIGN INT GRADES
One (non-deterministically chosen) user at a time may choose the teaching assistant role
and assign internal grades. They can continue making assignments or rescind the teaching
assistant role, in which case either another user may pick up the role, or the process can
successfully complete (by choosing SKIP .)
ASSIGN EXT GRADES = u i : User • choose fac.i → ASSIGN EXT (i)
u SKIP
ASSIGN EXT (i) = assign.i .faculty .ext → ASSIGN EXT (i)
u
drop fac.i → ASSIGN EXT GRADES
The same sort of process is then gone through for the assignment of external grades by
staff.
REC GRADES = u i : User • choose stu.i → REC EXT (i)
u SKIP
REC EXT (i) = receive.i .student .ext → REC EXT (i)
u
drop stu.i → SORT REC2
Finally, the students may receive their external grades.
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Workflow interface must include the choose and drop channels:
Workflow interface = {choose stu.u, choose fac.u, choose ta.u,
drop stu.u, drop fac.u, drop ta.u,
assign.u.faculty .g , assign.u.ta.g , receive.u.student .ext |
u ← User , g ← Grade}
and the new policy is then defined as the parallel composition of the original policy
(EXT PDP) and the new workflow, communicating on those events that are common
to both processes:
PDP WF = PDP |[ Workflow interface ]|WORKFLOW
To check if PDP WF satisfies Property 2, we use the process RESTRICT from sec-
tion 5.1, which for all users allows external assign events until that user chooses the student
role, and then denies all further external assign events. The assertion
PDP WF |[ Interface ]|RESTRICT v PDP WF
checks as expected.
This example is a demonstration of how the workflow provides a context within which
the system is secure, despite it being insecure in general. It does this because the sequential
nature of the workflow coupled with the restrictions on logging on and off imposes a
temporal requirement on when users may be active in a system. In the context of this
workflow, it becomes impossible for students to log on before the external grades have
been assigned.
8 Related work
Other efforts have been made to ascribe a formal semantics to XML-based languages. One
of the most closely related approaches is [6], where the authors map WS-Security protocols
to CSP (via an intermediate protocol notation). Properties of these protocols can then be
formally checked using FDR. The underlying formalism (CSP) is the same as in this work,
but the focus is on understanding protocols rather than policies.
WS-Security is also formalised in [1], where it is given a formal basis using the pi-
calculus. Properties of these protocols can again be formulated and proved. The focus
here is on the cryptographic protocols described by WS-Security.
Access control policies are considered in [3], from which the grades example in this
paper is taken. Policies written in XACML are translated into Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDDs), and thereby given a formal semantics. The margrave tool is presented, which
implements a number of special purpose BDD procedures, allowing a user to query and
compare policies. Queries are performed by limiting policies to attributes of interest,
although the authors intend to develop a special-purpose query language.
The work in [4] and [14] considers the problem of generating already verified XACML
policies. In [4] the authors define a simple programming language which allows specification
and verification of access control policies. A propositional language for describing goals of
agents is given, and decision procedure to determine if a goal is achievable with respect to
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a given policy. In [14] a tool is presented which generates an (already verified) XACML
policy from this language.
This easily allows policies which are conditional [2] on the state of the system.
9 Conclusions and further work
We have successfully shown how access control models can be expressed, using the CSP
framework and tools. We have therefore been able to use the CSP semantics to ascribe a
semantics to XACML, and shown how properties formally verified. Further, we have shown
how two access control policies may be compared, and the differences analysed using FDR.
We have shown how a primitive notion of workflow can be considered alongside these
models, and how the constraints imposed by the workflow may rule out possible security
concerns.
Many avenues could be pursued further. We could consider further the notion of
obligation, whereby a party is required to perform a particular action. Obligations would be
expressed as conventional CSP events, but checking obligation properties formally would
require consideration of liveness, which would require a richer semantic model that the
traces used here.
We have limited our consideration of the environment to a simple consideration of
time, also separation of duty constraints and workflow. Environment is clearly a much
wider concept, and developing our model to include more detailed aspects of environment
would provide a rich vein of work. Time could be explicitly modelled in Timed CSP,
although tools are not available to mechanically check Timed CSP specifications.
Rules may contain a condition, which is evaluated at runtime to calculate the effect of
the rule. It would be interesting to see to what extent these conditions can be understood
within the CSP framework. This would perhaps stretch the abilities of a process algebra,
and might be better described in a language which contains an explicit representation of
state.
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